

Towards Trustworthy Automated Program Verifiers: Formally Validating Translations into an Intermediate Verification Language

Gaurav Parthasarathy¹, Thibault Dardinier¹, Benjamin Bonneau³,
Peter Müller¹ and Alexander J. Summers²



PLDI 2024

Automated Program Verifiers

source program



automated program verifier




“verification success”



“potential errors”

Translational Automated Program Verifiers



Translational Automated Program Verifiers





Boogie

source program



intermediate verification
language (IVL) program



✓
“verification success”

✗
“potential errors”




Translational Automated Program Verifiers



Boogie

source program

intermediate verification
language (IVL) program



✓
“verification success”

✗
“potential errors”

is correct


Desired property: Soundness

IVL back-end
verifier reports ✓

Translational Automated Program Verifiers




Boogie



Translational Automated Program Verifiers



Boogie



Translational Automated Program Verifiers



Boogie

source program

intermediate verification




“verification success”


“potential errors”

Key problems:

1. No formal guarantees on **implementations used in practice**
2. Nontrivial implementations consisting of thousands of lines of code



Our Approach: Foundational Per-Run Certification




Provides formal guarantees to **existing** implementations

Key Contributions


1

Generic simulation methodology relating source language and IVL constructs


Key Contributions




Key Contributions



Key Contributions



Key Contributions



Challenge 1: Semantic Gap

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Viper

Boogie

State model

Heap, permissions for heap locations

Only variable store

Challenge 1: Semantic Gap

Viper

Boogie

State model

Heap, permissions for heap locations

Only variable store

Execution model

1. Expressions can fail to evaluate
2. Complex statements

1. Expressions always evaluate
2. Simple statements

Challenge 1: Semantic Gap

Viper

Boogie

State model

Heap, permissions for heap locations

Only variable store

Execution model

1. Expressions can fail to evaluate
2. Complex statements

1. Expressions always evaluate
2. Simple statements

Program logic

Flavor of separation logic

No advanced program logic

Challenge 1: Semantic Gap

Viper

```
exhale acc(x.f, q) &&  
      y.g > x.f
```

Boogie

```
WM := M;  
tmp := q;  
assert tmp >= 0;  
if(tmp != 0) {  
    assert M[x,f] >= tmp;  
}  
M[x,f] -= tmp;  
assert WM[y,g] > 0;  
assert WM[x,f] > 0;  
assert H[y,g] > H[x,f];  
havoc H';  
assume idOnPositive(H,H',M);  
H := H';  
assume GoodMask(M);
```

Challenge 1: Semantic Gap

Viper

exhale `acc(x.f, q) &&
y.g > x.f`

separation logic assertion



Boogie

```
WM := M;  
tmp := q;  
assert tmp >= 0;  
if(tmp != 0) {  
    assert M[x,f] >= tmp;  
}  
M[x,f] -= tmp;  
assert WM[y,g] > 0;  
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H := H';  
assume GoodMask(M);
```

Challenge 1: Semantic Gap

Viper

```
exhale acc(x.f, q) &&  
      y.g > x.f
```

Viper state:

Heap and permissions for heap locations

Boogie

```
WM := M;  
tmp := q;  
assert tmp >= 0;  
if(tmp != 0) {  
    assert M[x,f] >= tmp;  
}  
M[x,f] -= tmp;  
assert WM[y,g] > 0;  
assert WM[x,f] > 0;  
assert H[y,g] > H[x,f];  
havoc H';  
assume idOnPositive(H,H',M);  
H := H';  
assume GoodMask(M);
```

Viper state modeled explicitly via maps

permission lookup

heap lookup

Challenge 1: Semantic Gap

Viper

```
exhale acc(x.f, q) &&  
      y.g > x.f
```

Boogie

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assert H[y,g] > H[x,f];  
havoc H';  
assume idOnPositive(H,H',M);  
H := H';  
assume GoodMask(M);
```

Success conditions explicit

Challenge 1: Semantic Gap

Viper

```
exhale acc(x.f, q) &&  
      y.g > x.f
```

Boogie

```
WM := M;  
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assert H[y,g] > H[x,f];  
havoc H';  
assume idOnPositive(H,H',M);  
H := H';  
assume GoodMask(M);
```

Operations modeled via axiomatizations

Constrained via Boogie axiom

Challenge 2: Diverse Translations

Viper

```
exhale acc(x.f, q) &&  
      y.g > x.f
```

Boogie

```
WM := M;  
tmp := q;  
assert tmp >= 0;  
if(tmp != 0) {  
    assert M[x,f] >= tmp;  
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M[x,f] -= tmp;  
assert WM[y,g] > 0;  
assert WM[x,f] > 0;  
assert H[y,g] > H[x,f];  
havoc H';  
assume idOnPositive(H,H',M);  
H := H';  
assume GoodMask(M);
```

Omitted under certain conditions



Challenge 3: Non-Locality

Challenge 3: Non-Locality

Viper

```
method  $m_1$ (args)
  requires pre
  ensures post
{
  body
}
```

Boogie

```
procedure  $p_1$ (...)
{
  check pre and post well-formed
  body does not fail and respects pre + post
}
```

Challenge 3: Non-Locality

Viper

```
method m1(args)
  requires pre
  ensures post
{
  body
}
```

```
method m2(args)
  requires ...
  ensures ...
{
  m1(args)
}
```

Boogie

```
procedure p1(...)
{
  check pre and post well-formed
  body does not fail and respects pre + post
}
```

```
procedure p2(...)
{
  ...
  encode m1(args)
  ...
}
```

Challenge 3: Non-Locality

Viper

```
method m1(args)
  requires pre
  ensures post
{
  body
}
```


```
method m2(args)
  requires ...
  ensures ...
{
  m1(args)
}
```

Boogie

```
procedure p1(...)
{
  check pre and post well-formed
  body does not fail and respects pre + post
}
```

```
procedure p2(...)
{
  ...
  encode m1(args)
  ...
}
```

relies on non-local check



High-Level Proof Strategy

Viper

method m_1
...
method m_n

Boogie

procedure p_1
...
procedure p_n

High-Level Proof Strategy

Viper

method m_1
...
method m_n

spec(m_i) well-formed **and**

(all specs well-formed \Rightarrow
body(m_i) has no failing executions)

Boogie

procedure p_1
...
procedure p_n

body(p_i) has no failing executions



High-Level Proof Strategy

Viper

method m_1
...
method m_n

Boogie

procedure p_1
...
procedure p_n

spec(m_i) well-formed **and**
(all specs well-formed \Rightarrow
body(m_i) has no failing executions)

body(p_i) has no failing executions

for all $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$

front-end soundness

no failing method executions

no failing procedure executions

High-Level Proof Strategy

Viper

method m_1
...
method m_n

spec(m_i) well-formed **and**

(all specs well-formed \Rightarrow
body(m_i) has no failing executions)

Boogie

procedure p_1
...
procedure p_n

body(p_i) has no failing executions

Generate certificate automatically
(challenges appear here)

body(p_i) simulates body(m_i)

for all $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$

front-end soundness

no failing method executions

no failing procedure executions

Simulation Decomposition

Viper

```
exhale acc(x.f, q) &&  
       y.g > x.f
```

simulates



Boogie

```
WM := M;  
tmp := q;  
assert tmp >= 0;  
if(tmp != 0) {  
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Simulation Decomposition

Viper

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exhale acc(x.f, q) &&  
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```

Handling semantic gap:

Decompose into simulations of separate semantic concerns

Simulation Decomposition

Viper

```
exhale acc(x.f, q) &&  
y.g > x.f
```

simulates

Boogie

```
WM := M;  
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H := H';  
assume GoodMask(M);
```

Handling semantic gap:

Decompose into simulations of separate semantic concerns

Simulation Decomposition

Viper

exhale `acc(x.f, q) &&`
`y.g > x.f`

`acc(x.f, q)`

simulates

`y.g > x.f`

Handling semantic gap:

Decompose into simulations of separate semantic concerns

exhale finalization

Boogie

```
WM := M;
tmp := q;
assert tmp >= 0;
if(tmp != 0) {
    assert M[x,f] >= tmp;
}
M[x,f] -= tmp;
assert WM[y,g] > 0;
assert WM[x,f] > 0;
assert H[y,g] > H[x,f];
havoc H';
assume idOnPositive(H,H',M);
H := H';
assume GoodMask(M);
```

High-Level Proof Automation Strategy


1. Decompose simulation into small semantic concerns
2. Tactics for simulation of resulting small semantic concerns

Evaluation



Viper program

Boogie program



Evaluated certificate generation on 72 representative Viper programs

All generated certificates are successfully checked by Isabelle

Evaluation



File	Viper LoC	Boogie LoC	Isabelle LoC	Time to check certificate [s]
testHistory	205	1711	7035	126.3
defer	211	853	4717	60.6
inv-test	92	514	2596	56.5
darvas	414	2014	9545	242.4
banerjee	91	582	2800	38.4
kusters	112	583	3146	46.2

Conclusion

